Faithless Power as Fratricide:
Is there an Alternative in Somalia?
Abdi Ismail Samatar

I. The Meaning of Faith
Mohamed Suliman’s lovely and famous song for the Eid is not only
suggestive of the joys of the past but reminisces about the great values
that the Somali people shared and which served them well during testing times of yesteryear. Here is a line from the song:
Hadba kii arrin keena Ka kalee aqbalaaya Ilaahii ina siiyay isagaa ku
abaal leh
Simply put, this line and the spirit of the whole song echo Somalis’
traditional acumen to generate timely ideas and the competence to listen and heed productive compromises. These attributes that nurtured
their collective best interests have been on the wane for three decades
and are now in peril or even to perish for eternity. As a result, much
despair is visible in the Somali landscape. Yet it is worth remembering
that there is no inevitability about the extension of the present despondency into the future as long as civic-minded Somalis are resolute and
remain wedded to their compatriots’ well-being and cardinal values.
The concept of Faith has triple meanings in the context of this brief
essay (Figure 1). First, it means devotion to the Creator and the straight
path of Islam. This is clear from the core principles of Islam (not as
defined by sectarian ideologues but by the Qur’an and the Haddith),
one of which is imaan. Second, Faith enshrines self-reliance and the
effort to pull oneself up by the bootstraps as well as attend to the needs
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of one’s family. Third, Faith presupposes confidence in the community’s (neighborhood or nation) commitment to justice and fairness for
all its members. These three dimensions do not exhaust the richness of
the concept, but they provide enough scaffolding for this article. The
essay’s focus is particularly on the first, with secondary implications
for the latter. Implicit in the essay is the assumption that there was a
time in Somali history when leaders and the general population were
true to the edicts of imaan in public and family spheres. As the discussion will show, these two have been battered for the past three decades.
The genealogy of Somalia’s betrayal had four phases and the pathways
to its rejuvenation will minimally require a return to the Faith—one
sophisticated enough to cut through the muck of this age and with
assurance to meet a globalizing and inter-civilizational world.
II. Faith and Freedom
A. Faith under Colonialism
The struggle against British and Italian colonialism was initiated at the
turn of the previous century by the twin forces of Islam and Somalis’
sense of being in the world. Sayyid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan,
charged by the demands of the colonial officers to abstain from calling
for morning prayers in Berbera and infuriated by the Christianization of Somali orphans, took the lead to rid the country of the colonial
scourge.1 Despite the existence of common values and heritage, it was
extraordinarily difficult to mobilize the population for an anti-colonial
resistance. In addition, the scarcity of military and material resources,
and a nonexistent communication infrastructure, were major barriers to unified and collective action. Sayyid Mohamed’s only instruments that gained the attention of Somali people were Islam and the
enormous power of his poetic gifts.2 The dearth of deep knowledge
of Islam was compensated for by the strong attachment of Somalis
to the axioms of the Faith. It was to this point that Sayyid Mohamed
hitched his message of nationalist awakening. Most Somalis rallied to
his side except for a few colonial lackeys or tribal chauvinists. Britain’s
overwhelming power was so deeply and repeatedly frustrated by the
Daraawiish’s skills that Somalia became the first colonial conflagration in which warplanes were used to subjugate freedom fighters. The
guerilla tactics of the Daraawiish were so effective that they almost
succeeded in driving the colonists out of the country in 1910. How-
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Figure 1: Dimensions of Faith

ever, hubris got the best of the leadership, which led them to fight a
conventional war that ultimately resulted in the extinction of Somalia’s
maiden war of liberation. This was a glorious war, which inspired
modern Somali nationalism and ultimately gave birth to the Somali
Youth League (SYL). What made the Sayyid and his movement endure
for more than two decades in spite of the overwhelming odds against
them were intolerance of indignity and steadfast loyalty to the Faith
and to a common destiny. Disaster followed on the few occasions when
the leadership deviated from these principles.
Once the major Somali/Islamic resistance was contained, British and
Italian authorities (in their respective Somali colonies) had the challenge of manufacturing consent from the population. They thus sought
to bring on board certain religious leaders. Such efforts mollified some
of the antipathy toward colonial rule while deliberately heightening
clanist identity as the principal political signifier of the native population. This set in place a process whose dynamic continues to this day
to undermine national solidarity. It was during this period of Islamic
hibernation that anti-colonial movements led by the Somali Youth
League/Somali National League (SYL/SNL) emerged.3 These parties
tapped Islamic sentiments to rally the public for independence, but the
rising political class never entertained a major role for Islam. Instead,
it simply assumed the importance and presence of the faith in Somali
lives and the new history. In the South, SYL came to dominate the
political landscape after a brief period of existence. Word spread to all
Somali territories, and, subsequently, the spirit of Somalinimo, which
lay dormant for a quarter of a century, was resuscitated. Mogadishu
became the nationalist hub. The managers of the Italian Trusteeship
meted out utter cruelty to the SYL and its followers, often using what
nationalists came to dub as “Pro-Italian” elements. Despite being outgunned and “out-resourced,” the Party maintained its resolve and the
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population heeded its message of national unity, common civic belonging, and freedom.4
Italy’s agenda of turning cultural genealogy into the principal political Somali identity got its first thrashing in the municipal elections of
1954, and the fate of such tactics was sealed by the overwhelming SYL
victory in the 1956 election for the territorial assembly.5 What gave the
Somali people confidence in SYL’s inclusive political program was the
way in which all were treated equally. Second, the leadership exuded
trust and devotion to the collective good. A most germane example
was the resistance of key leaders of the party to take up ministerial
portfolios in 1956.6 Nearly all the individuals that Premier-designate
Abdullahi Isa approached declined his offer, noting that “they did not
want to shame themselves given that they did not have commensurate
skills or the experience to adequately tackle the demands of such onerous responsibility.” Faith in SYL’s principles and fear of public ridicule
were the reasons for their now stunning behavior (contrast this to
today’s Transitional Federal Government and other aspirants).
B. Democracy and Faith
Political divisions between civic nationalists and sectarian entrepreneurs re-emerged in the North and in the South during the dying days
of colonialism, but the nationalists remained dominant. After independence, Somalia’s new leaders anchored the liberal national Constitution on Islam, as Articles 30 and 50 make clear. Article 30 declares that,
“The personal status of Moslems is governed by the general principles
of the Islamic Sharia” while Article 50 states that, “The doctrine of
Islam is the main source of Laws of the State.”7 Despite these pronouncements, the state’s political character was democratic and senior
leaders were not concerned about political Islam.8 Yet, they were aware
of the potential influence that Islamic leaders could command and
attempted to channel it toward reinforcing the population’s commitment to the faith while guarding against sectarian use of the faith for
particularistic political ends.
The principal concern of the democratic leadership and those who
remained faithful to the foundational principles of SYL and other
civic-oriented parties was the gradual reshaping of sectarian elements
in parliament. Some senior civil servants, whose core value was selfenrichment, exploited the very authority that the public entrusted to
them. The first major indication of this development came during
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the 1961 constitutional plebiscite when two disgruntled leaders tried
to undermine the referendum by tacitly mobilizing their genealogical groups to vote negative (because they or their friends were not
appointed to the highest offices in the land). These two individuals
were less concerned with destabilizing the young republic and more
committed to exacting political revenge in the hope that the defeat of
the Charter would humiliate the nation’s new leaders and thus afford
them an unimpeded rise to power. These two senior ministers in the
government failed to appreciate the value of supporting the Charter
on its merits and honestly competing for political office in the presidential election that immediately followed the plebiscite. What made
this behavior bewildering was the fact that these men were among the
architects of the constitution and thus had every opportunity to shape
it and in fact did so. The majority of the Somali people thought differently than the two officials and endorsed the Charter. One of the two
men took the challenge and ran for the presidency. His effort almost
paid off but the founding president of the republic went on to win by
three votes. The challenger’s camp refused to accept the verdict even
after the Supreme Court verified the result.9 From then on, expediency became the guiding principle of the opposition. The democratic
government was constantly confronted by opportunistic forces whose
only manifesto was “bring down the government so we can take over.”
Loyalty to the nation and the Constitution, as well as accountable government that served the public, were not their priority. Such a modus
operandi was essentially at odds with Islamic principles and the democratic traditions of liberation and Somali culture. It set a noxious political precedent for the country. Henceforth, most parliamentarians used
their posts as a personal instrument for accumulating wealth and gaining favors, rather than serving their constituencies and the country. It
is this odious practice that attracted the incisive verse of Somalia’s poet
laureate Timaade:
Members of parliament when we assembled them in one place,
Presidents and ministers when they were elected,
Healthy minds and people we were facing the same direction,
Then came those who confused us only to milk everything for their sole
benefit,
Never to lose an electoral seat whose only intention it was,
In our rural areas they put a knife in every hand,
Those hacks who bombarded us with fake wailings of sectarian
solidarity,
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The poison they injected in us killed nobility of character,
Lies and lies they festoon us with, Beware.10

Such behavior desecrated all three meanings of Faith and subsequently derailed Somali democracy and the rule of law.11 Figure 2
illustrates the nature of this order rooted in faithlessness. This practice
induced a gradual erosion of the common values that Somalis shared
and the regime that came to power in 1967 took this to new heights.
C. Dictatorships of Mistrust
Just when the population was on the verge of despair the national army
intervened and removed the regime from power, with an outpouring
of endorsement by most of the citizens. The military’s honeymoon
lasted for several years. A number of popular programs were undertaken, such as the script for the Somali language, literacy campaigns,
establishment of the national university, and investments in infrastructure. While the regime enjoyed popular legitimacy during this period,
its governance paradigm was shifting quietly in troubling ways. The
military regime slowly destroyed the public service establishment’s
professional autonomy by first placing military officers at the head
of every institution and then summarily appointing loyalists to posts
for which they did not have qualifications. Fear replaced respect in
the relationship between military political appointees and the professional cadre. Second, by the mid-1970s, recruitment and promotion in
the military took on a distinctly clanist turn in ways never witnessed
before in Somali public service.12 In sharp contrast to the democratic
constitution, the military sidestepped the Sharia and secularized family law. Once this was announced on national radio, it generated heated
discussion about the religious character of the military leaders. The
state proclamation reinforced the suspicion many Somalis had about
“Godless communism.” Thereafter, a number of major imams began
to preach in Mogadishu’s mosques and defied the regime’s authority to
change such an elemental law, even if some of the modifications were
in the right direction towards greater gender equality. Conscious of
the explosive potential of the challenge, the military rounded up ten
imams and took them to a hastily arranged national security court,
which sentenced them to death. The sentence was carried out immediately, breaking the most cherished feature of postcolonial Somali politics: open political debate without state coercion or violence.
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Figure 2: Faithless Order

This murderous use of sectarian power damaged the integrity of the
system of order and the citizenry’s collective projects. Having lost the
popular mandate, the regime turned to un-Islamic and un-Somali tools
to prolong its hold on power. By 1980 degeneration quickened, culminating in the destruction of parts of Hargeisa and Burao, effectively
alienating communities from one another. Here is how this author
described that situation in 1989:
Peripheral-capitalist tribal politics came to prominence in the early 1960s
as a means through which certain groups within [ruling elite] gained
access to the state apparatus and its resources under the pressures of
the competitive political marketplace. The employment of ethnicity as a
political ideology…in Somalia unleashed destructive forces which razed
the parliamentary electoral process, fractured the governing class, led
to unprecedented emergence of a repressive and authoritarian regime,
alienated communities from each other in ways previously unknown
in Somali history, undermined the basis of state legitimacy, and, finally,
threaten the very existence of Somalia as a country by swiftly and fatally
maiming Somali nationalist ideology…13

Similarly, the political and military opposition adopted the regime’s
tactics of dividing the nation into genealogical-political groups and
thus substantially contributed to the devaluation of common belonging. For twelve long years these two actors, bereft of faith in any sense
of the word, dominated the landscape and created conditions uncongenial to good governance, healthy communities, and the promise of a
better Somalia.
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As imaan evaporated, competition for state power and commensurate
privileges became more grotesque. Civic-minded and faithful Somalis
kept a low profile and failed to mobilize the population. By the time
the military dictator was chased out of the capital, warlords and sectarian political entrepreneurs had carved the county into fiefdoms,
further depleting ethical capital. Bloodletting in Mogadishu in 1991
and the killing fields of the Bay region in early 1991–92, with warlords
using food as a weapon against hapless people, was the ultimate consequence of a faithless power. The United Nations and the United States
came to the assistance of the starving population, cleared the roads of
the criminal gangs, and fed the indigent. Unfortunately, the humanitarian effort was not matched by a serious political investment to help
the population rebuild their state institutions. Deleterious advice,
based on an archaic worldview, wasted the fleeting opportunity and
misdirected the effort, leading to the withdrawal of the multinational
forces. The derangement of politics mushroomed into warlord and
bigoted dominance and the misguided international community flirted
with these monstrosities. The Somali peoples’ ordeal failed to attract
sympathetic attention from powerful states. Yet the possibility of three
criminals hiding in Somalia was sufficient justification for the world’s
Superpower to provide more resources to the warlords and charge
them to hunt down those suspected of giving these individuals refuge. Tested by their prolonged agony, the population rallied around
religious leaders. Within three months, the warlords were routed and
Mogadishu was relatively calm for the first time in seventeen years.
The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was formed and soon much of
south-central Somalia became liberated.
E. Hope of Imaan’s Return
What made such speedy success possible? Loyalty to the Faith was the
central “piston” in the emerging energy. Sentiments in the old capital
were mobilized when the population realized that the warlords and
their financial backers, who had no sympathy for their plight, were
now willing to visit destruction on the people in order to capture three
alleged terrorists. The confluence of these events and a rising temper of
common Fate were reminiscent of 1949,14 when the world sided with
the return of the Italian fascists and SYL led the charge to confront
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this challenge. Faithful bonds can overcome towering menaces, as displayed in the people’s revolts in 1949 and 2006.
The UIC led the way and restored peace to the capital. Inspired by
Islamic principles, the movement spread quickly and much of southcentral Somalia came under their sway. Even the renegade regions of
the North and Northeast felt the heat, which quickly led their leaders
to declare that they would adopt the Sharia as the law of the land.
These swift successes concealed the serious systemic weaknesses of
the UIC, best unveiled by the inability to manage the regions under
its control. First, the UIC’s incoherence was a product of its recent
founding as well as its quick rise to power. It had to hastily organize
an assembly and executive committee after the movement’s victories
became apparent. In other words, it did not have an organized institutional infrastructure in place. Second, although it established an executive organ, the line of command (particularly in military affairs) was
not clear and this led to some less-than-strategic campaigns. Third, the
UIC leadership and assembly lacked the intellectual, diplomatic, and
political competence to understand the dangers of a world dominated
by a “war on terror” mentality. The group failed to heed advice that
might have mollified those risks.15 Fourth, given the absence of tight
organizational discipline, much time was devoted to endless meetings,
which were in part used to build cohesion among a diverse membership. Inevitability, this meant that relatively minor issues and details
took center stage, and precious time was lost. Finally, the UIC’s lack
of coherent and workable governance strategy—beyond the call for
the Sharia to be the basic law of the land—added to the incapacity. No
other administrative competence existed. Additionally, there was no
negotiating plan to bring on board skeptical but sympathetic Somalis,
or to seriously engage a hostile international community, the TFG,
and others. This created opportunities for the enemies of the movement to demonize the UIC, which provided political cover for the
invaders. Despite all of these shortcomings, the spirit of Muslinimo and
Somalinimo prevailed for six months and boosted the confidence of the
Somali people to believe that they could restore peace to their land and
begin governing themselves with dignity.
F. Struggling for Freedom and Faith
A ferociously hostile international climate and a determined Ethiopian
enemy took advantage of the drawbacks of the UIC and derailed the
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movement. Many commentators wrote off the UIC and the nationalist
movement as the Ethiopian military committed heinous crimes against
the population and destroyed life-sustaining systems the people had
established during the previous fifteen years. More than 20,000 people
were killed and 1.5 million had been displaced. The latter group and
others face famine.16
Despite the war crimes the Ethiopian invaders committed, toughminded young Somalis rose to the occasion and mounted a fierce
nationalist resistance that has defied the agenda of the invaders and
their international backers. Consequently, the inept TFG, which was
holed up in Baidoa and a neighborhood in Mogadishu guarded by
Ethiopian and African Union forces, became irrelevant. Ethiopia tried
to put the best face on its defeat by claiming to be withdrawing “victoriously.”17 What these developments make clear is that the cruelties of
an invading force can never hold a free and mobilized people in bondage without paying a heavy price, and that invasion is unsustainable
and can never bolster an illegitimate regime.
Somalia’s new freedom fighters energized the population inside and
outside the country. Their sacrifices created the possibility for a negotiated peace and genuine reconciliation. Harnessing the opportunity
has been the responsibility of the leadership that called itself Alliance
for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). This outfit was supposed to
be a solidarity between the UIC, a handful of former members of the
TFI parliament, and representatives from the diaspora, but the UIC
was the core unit despite the pretensions of others. Unfortunately, the
ARS and the UIC failed to develop a political strategy for re-liberation
that honored and supported the resistance operations in the country.
Moreover, the organizational ability of the UIC was compounded by
the ineptitude of the parliamentarians and, collectively, they botched
the effort. Having low capacity is not a crime in and of itself, and one
must honor genuine effort that does not succeed due to incapacity, but
incompetence is not the only thing that bedeviled the alliance. It has
been apparent from the day the ARS was established that most of the
parliamentarians were lusting for a way to parachute themselves back
to the TFG and that their senior leaders were sponsored by the divisive
tribal formula. In addition, they had neither the commitment nor the
skills to engage in the tough-minded chess game with hostile international forces. They thought that nice platitudes on the airwaves and a
weak backbone against the pressure of the hostile forces were the perfect strategy to deliver them to power and introduce false peace and
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reconciliation. What became clear in the last few months of negotiations in Djibouti is the fact that the ARS leadership has been less than
candid and less than strategic. It may have even engaged in activities
and behavior that were fraudulent. Such conduct and deeds are best
illustrated by concrete examples.
First, when the ARS leadership initiated its moves and went to Khartoum and Nairobi in March and April 2008, troubling signs appeared
when they indicated their reluctance to consult with key members,
including the executive committee, by unilaterally signing agreements.
When they were called on this breach of trust, they vacated town and
moved to Djibouti. There they began a unilateral project of dealing
with the TFG under the supervision of a devious U.N. outfit. Simultaneously, they accused Eritrea of instrumentally using the resistance
for its own ends.18 Despite the goodwill efforts of some members to
resolve the problem and restore confidence, the leadership ignored
their work, which led to a split in the group. Further attempts failed to
bear fruit and the “negotiations” in Djibouti continued.
Second, despite the support of the people of Djibouti, the ARS wing
in Djibouti fell apart as a cohesive unit because its two leaders unilaterally decided what the position of ARS was going to be in the
negotiations. In addition, incompetence marred the operations and
management of the process as the entire affair lacked planning and
deliberation. For example, there was an ARS delegation that came to
visit U.N. headquarters, but no preparation was made for them to
partake in the discussions. The delegation sat as observers rather than
participants in the Security Council Chambers, amply demonstrating
the organization’s ineptitude.
Third, another manifestation of the drift from the straight path
became clear as the negotiations reached a high point when joint committees (composed of the TFG and ARS) were to be formed. One such
committee was to consist of seven members from the TFG and seven
from ARS, but the head of the ARS Council asked the Executive that he
be allowed to add six extra members of his choosing. He added that he
would make the request to the U.N. representative. This was allowed,
and the rest is history.
Fourth, the final act of the negotiations was the agreement stipulating that 275 new ARS representatives would be added to the already
existing 275-person TFG parliament. This was not only offensive to the
Somali people, but also demonstrated the absence of coherence as the
former Speaker of the Parliament is reported to have proposed that he
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would “select 30% of the new MPs while the Hawiye tribe can share
the remainder.”
Fifth, the head of the ARS Djibouti wing met with tribal groups in
Mogadishu to try and work out a political deal, thus reneging on the
UIC’s original motto of avoiding tribal politics. This particular affair
was bizarre as he tried to replicate the very process that he and his
comrades rejected when Ali Mahdi Mohamed tried the same maneuver
in 2007. Lastly, the ARS Djibouti wing finally exposed its true colors by
accepting the foul 4.5 formula as the basis of re-establishing Somali
national institutions. This made the ARS political agenda identical to
that of the TFG. In the end, the leaders of the Djibouti wing appointed
200 new MPs, who, in turn, voted to select their patron as president of
the TFG. Subsequently, a prime minister was appointed, but he was
deprived of selecting his cabinet, thus creating a farce. In effect, the
ARS Djibouti wing became the dominant force in the TFG and has
effectively traded the original faith-based agenda for their political
ambition by breaching the ARS Charter as well as the anchor values
of the UIC. In other words, they seem not to cherish any principles or
agreements but subscribe to political expediency and, thus, embrace
the faithless politics of the past—leadership without imaan and, therefore, no amaano! One must ask, then, the tough questions: was the damage exacted upon the population based on the 4.5 formula? Were those
who sacrificed their lives for the liberation motivated by 4.5? If deception had moral persuasion, the old politicians would still be reigning.
In addition to these diversions from the straight path of imaan, significant elements of the “Shabaab” and members of the Courts have
proposed that they and they alone have the wisdom and authority to
interpret the tenets of the Faith. Furthermore, they are demanding that
all others must live by this interpretation or be marginalized or eliminated. In other words, their personal interpretation is deemed more
sacred than the generous and flexible ways of Islam. Second, they are
turning Islam into a most rigid, authoritarian, and violent enterprise
when it is exactly the opposite. Third, they are failing to realize that
physical coercion can never make a person faithful and that teaching,
nurturing, and engaging people are the most effective ways to convince
Somalis to live by the spirit and word of the Faith. If violence were sustainable and effective, the old dictatorship and warlords would still be
dominant. Such a strategy has no future.
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III. Faithful Politics: The Alternative Future
Neither the machinations of ARS/TFG as we know them now nor a sectarian and perverted Islamicist rule will create the social and political
climate required to restore imaan and rebuild the legitimate institutions
the country so desperately needs.19 What, then, might be a formula
that can build on the Faith and the democratic traditions of Somalis as
well as the spirit of resistance? In the first instance, a regime founded
on the odious 4.5 formula, headed by an Islamicist, is now in place, but
it is unlikely to deliver the promise of peace and genuine reconciliation as it attempts to cling to power without a national agenda.20 This
is not an option for the Somali people who have defeated the Ethiopian occupation and thwarted the so-called international community’s
wrong-headed intent to impose an incompetent and tribal-based political dispensation.
I remember quite well when some civic-minded Somalis called upon
the international community not to sanction the Ethiopian agenda of a
warlord/tribal government for Somalia. Its response was that the warlords were a necessary evil needed to restore the peace, and that this
was the only option available. The international community proffered
that Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf was the tough guy who must be the head
of state. His obstinate character would be enough to ensure that the
Ethiopian regime would not have its way. Some people warned about
the fallacy of these assumptions but insistence on it demonstrated
either ineptitude to understand what was being said or it had the sole
purpose of foisting a warlord outfit beholden to Ethiopia on the Somali
people. It is ironic that the same actors have been clamoring to condemn Abdullahi Yusuf as the main obstacle to peace and to proclaim
the invader’s departure as creating a security vacuum—a vacuum for
the millions of people they displaced! More recently, they have been
praising the new TFG head as a moderate and legitimate leader. It
is worth remembering that it was only two years ago that Mr. Sharif
Ahmed and the UIC were being cast as extremists who were bedfellows of Al-Qaida. Unfortunately, there is nothing moderate about the
leadership and the predatory cabal around the President as they imagine schemes to defraud the population.
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A. From Faithless Power to Faithful Authority
Since 1967, the leaders of nearly all regimes have been marred by the
absence of Faith and the dearth of counter-balancing institutions that
could provide a sense of national orientation. Advocates of the tribalist thesis of Somali politics maintain that one of two scenarios can
provide the basis of political stability in the country. First, they allege
that a political regime based on the 4.5 formula will solve the problem
of representation among Somalia’s “competing” clans. Second, they
posit that a combination of 4.5 and a national assembly consisting of
two houses, with one chamber dedicated to traditional “leaders,” will
secure the tribal balance. We have detailed elsewhere the fairy tale
of the tribalist thesis and why such propositions cannot and will not
usher in a new era of faithful government and justice.21
Thus, ideas based on broadly understood Islam and civic identity
can and will provide an alternative moral framework for a desirable
future. Such grounding will not transpire through the amalgamation
of the resistance with a defunct TFG, characterized by faithless power,
because that has degraded the valor of the former. The power struggles
between the two camps that claim to champion Islam have gutted the
belief of the population in what used to be the UIC. Instead, cosmopolitan religious leaders and civic nationalists must call for a national conference inside that shall produce a blueprint for the road ahead. One of
the principal tasks of the conference should be to draw up the mandate
of two parallel, non-competing, and counter-balancing institutions for
the country. These will consist of a Moral Authority (MA) and a Political Authority (PA) (Figure 3). A detailed presentation of the roles,
responsibilities, and the operations of the two authorities will have to
wait for another time, but this brief note should suffice as a prelude.
The Moral Authority will have four functions. First, it will be
responsible for ensuring that Islamic and Somali cultural education
are carried out across the country as part of a progressive curriculum
designed to empower the society to partake in a globalizing Africa
and world. Second, it will establish three major centers of Islamic and
cultural learning in the country. Such centers will provide for a liberal
interpretation of Islam and Somali traditions and shall not be dominated by any closed-minded sectarian interpretations of the Faith and
culture. Third and most critically, it will create another three regional
centers where communal conflagrations are resolved fairly and justly
so that such conflicts are not transformed into political mêlée. In addi-
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Figure 3: Faithful Order

tion, these centers will become platforms for communal cooperation.
Fourth, MA will be a nonpartisan national anchor for providing direction when and if the Political Authority diverges from the spirit and
word of the Constitution or becomes dysfunctional. Finally, the MA
will produce an annual report that will address the moral state of the
nation and the country’s civic challenges. The report will be circulated
through the airwaves as well as in community centers around the
country.
Given the centrality of the Moral Authority for the nation’s collective well-being and its nonpartisan nature, it is vital that those who
will serve as leaders and members of the MA have exceptional credibility, an unblemished record of faithful/civic life, and superb training in Islam and Somali cultural studies. Such members must not be
affiliated with and or involved in political or sectarian organizations.
The Authority will have eleven members appointed for a period of
seven years and will conduct its affairs on a consensual basis. An independently managed endowment will be established to provide the
necessary resources for the operations of the authority, and the MA
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will have a weekly radio and TV program that will discuss the major
concerns of the country in order to educate the public. An independent
board of trustees will be created whose only job is to vet, appoint, and
dismiss members. The board of trustees will have a reserve list of at
least eleven people at all times.
The MA will not have legislative and coercive power, but will use
education and moral persuasion as its instruments. It will have access
to private and state media and shall have the authority to mobilize
the population against injustice and bad governance, and for faithful
and progressive change. Such an ethical establishment is intended to
demonstrate to the population the importance of high Islamic/ethical/
Somali standards of public and communal life. Thus, the MA will not
have the authority to dismiss governments but can inform the population of its good and ill deeds and how the problems might be tackled.
Likewise, the Political Authority will consist of political parties and
governments (local, regional, and national). To ensure that the country is not re-victimized by exclusive political parties and entrepreneurs, there can only be two national political parties. Each party will
be required to have a national base through its membership. Neither
party nor its leadership will be allowed to use Islam or tribal belonging
as the basis of its membership or program. Second, the two parties will
be monitored by a national inspectorate associated with the MA that
will use the highest ethical and moral standards. Any party found to
engage in unethical practices will be held responsible and the public
will be informed about such practice. Third, there shall be established
an independent electoral commission whose responsibility is to organize and conduct national and local elections in the country.
Deliberately separating the role and responsibilities of the MA and
PA is vital. It is meant to warrant that the shared values—Islam and
culture—are not used by political and sectarian entrepreneurs. Further,
it will affirm that the nation’s institutional apparatus will maximize the
use of and valorize the value of such assets. Simply put, it is not Somali
faith or culture that has caused the catastrophe but the detachment of
public power from such moral moorings. Resetting those principles as
institutional anchors of public affairs will enhance stability and restore
justice to the land. Put bluntly, in this new milieu, regimes and aspirant
political actors intent on maldevelopment will never again be allowed
to corrupt the spirit of ethical communality.
Finally, the need for such institutionalization of Faith and culture
is paramount as it creates an independent authority that is not solely
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driven by the lust for political power. I would venture that if the country had a legitimate moral voice when the crisis of governance began,
the people would have had a trusted authority to turn to for guidance.
Such an authority would have had the credibility to call on the people
to maintain peace and order until a legitimate political dispensation
was restored. Further, and more importantly, Somalis would have been
sufficiently informed and educated about developments such that they
would have stopped the abusive regimes long before the catastrophe.
Only through this or similar methods of returning to faithful and competent authority will the country emerge from the current calamity of
faithless power in the guise of pseudo-Islamic politics and parodies.
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